Federal Practice - Venue - Applicability of General Venue Satute to Defendant Brought Into a Case After Removal from the State Court by Yocca, Nick E., S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 56 Issue 7 
1958 
Federal Practice - Venue - Applicability of General Venue Satute to 
Defendant Brought Into a Case After Removal from the State 
Court 
Nick E. Yocca S.Ed. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nick E. Yocca S.Ed., Federal Practice - Venue - Applicability of General Venue Satute to Defendant Brought 
Into a Case After Removal from the State Court, 56 MICH. L. REV. 1203 (1958). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol56/iss7/14 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1958] RECENT DECISIONS 1203 
FEDERAL PRACTICE-VENUE-APPLICABILITY OF GENERAL VENUE STATUTE 
TO DEFENDANT BROUGHT INTO A CASE .AFTER REMOVAL FROM THE STATE 
COURT-Plaintiffs, citizens of Missouri, orginally brought suit in an Alabama 
state court against D,, a citizen of Virginia, and D., a citizen of Minnesota, 
to recover for injuries sustained in an automobile accident which occurred 
in Alabama. After defendants had removed to the federal district court, 
plaintiffs amended their complaint to include D,, a citizen of Florida, 
service of process having been made in accordance with the Alabama non-
resident motorist statute.1 By special appearance, D. moved for dismissal 
because of improper venue.2 Held, motion granted and cause dismissed 
as to D •. While the original action was removed from the state court, the 
action against D. was commenced in the federal court and is subject to 
the general venue provisions3 which apply to diversity of citizenship cases 
and which require that all plaintiffs or' all defendants reside within the 
judicial district. Craft v. Murphy, (M.D. Ala. 1957) 156 F. Supp. 486.4 
The crux of the principal case is whether the amendment joining Da is 
to be analyzed as a new action arising under diversity jurisdiction or as 
an incident to the older action which reached the federal court through 
its removal jurisdiction. The court in the principal case adopted the former 
view and refused to follow an earlier decision of a New York federal district 
J.Afa. Code (1940) tit. 7, §199. 
2 Da also contested the sufficiency of the service of process, but the case was decided 
on the basis of venue, making discussion of service unnecessary. 
8 "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, 
except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where all 
plaintiffs or all defendants reside." 28 U.S.C. (1952) §139l(a). 
4 For general information on venue and removal jurisdiction, see 3 MooRE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE, 2d ed., p. 2119 et seq. (1948); Evans, "The Removal of Causes, Federal Removal 
Jurisdiction in Diversity of Citizenship Cases," 33 VA. L. REv. 445 (1947). Appointment 
of an agent within the district to accept service of process waives improper venue. Nierbo 
v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939). This does not extend to the 
fictitious appointment of an agent under nonresident motorist statutes. Olberding v. 
Ill. Central R. Co., 346 U.S. 338 (1953). 
1204 MICHIGAN LA.w REVIEW [ Vol. 56 
court which reached an opposite result.5 With no controlling precedent 
from the appellate levels, each of these courts based its decision on cases 
not in point. 6 The holding of the principal case appears to be erroneous. 
Since venue and removal are matters of statutory grace,7 and since the 
federal statute expressly provides for the summoning of additional parties 
into a suit after it has been removed to the federal court,8 an amendment 
adding a party defendant should not change the character of the suit, 
even as to the added party. Since the section of the statute which catego-
rically sets forth the removal provisions has been interpreted to be in-
dependent and free of the provision spelling out the specific venue appli-
cable to suits commenced in the federal courts,9 it is illogical to read this 
same venue provision into a different subsection of the same removal 
provision as was done in the principal case. If D, had been joined in the 
state court before removal, there could be no objection to venue in the 
applicable federal court. Therefore, there is no hardship in making him 
a party after removal.1° Congress must have intended that the federal 
court to which the case is removed be proper venue for all parties, whether 
. they were in the suit originally or not. That the district court is given 
power to issue service of process and complete defective service after a 
case has been removed11 strengthens this conclusion. Perhaps the district 
judge should weigh any special burdens placed on the additional party 
against the policy in favor of keeping a case together when he exercises 
his broad discretionary power over the amending process,12 but lack of 
conformity to the general venue provision should not absolutely prevent 
the joinder attempted in the principal case. 
There is another problem which the court alluded to but did not dis-
cuss. If D. had been joined in the state court, he would have had the 
opportunity to decide for himself whether or not he wanted the case re-
5 Fawick Corp. v. Alfa Export Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1955) 135 F. Supp. 108. 
6 The principal case was grounded upon Olberding v. III. Central R. Co., note 4 
supra, while the New York court based its decision upon Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, 
Inc., 345 U.S. 663 (1953), and Moss v. Atlantic Coastline R. Co., (2d Cir. 1946) 157 F. (2d) 
1005, cert. den. 330 U.S. 839 (1947). These cases did not involve the joinder of a defendant 
after removal to the federal court had been accomplished. 
7 Little York Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1877); Ex parte 
Wisner, 203 U.S. 449 (1906); 1 BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
172 (1950). 
s 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1447(a); Rule 21, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 28 U.S.C. (1952). 
9 28 U.S.C. (1952) §144l(a); Lee v. Chesapeake and Ohio R. Co., 260 U.S. 653 (1923); 
General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. Southern R. Co., 260 U.S. 261 (1922); Moss v. 
Atlantic Coastline R. Co., (2d Cir. 1946) 157 F. (2d) 1005, cert. den. 330 U.S. 839 (1947); 
Buffington v. Vulcan Furniture Mfg. Corp., (W.D. Ark. 1950) 94 F. Supp. 13. 
10 See the principal case at 488, and note 8 supra. 
1128 U.S.C. (1952) §§144l(a), 1448. 
12 See Rules 15, 20(b) and 21, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1952); Davis v. L. L. 
Cohen & Co., 268 U.S. 638 (1925); Kerner v. Rackmill, (M.D. Pa. 1953) 111 F. Supp. 150; 
Sanders v. Metzger, (E.D. Pa. 1946) 66 F. Supp. 262; 1 BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 136, 872 et seq. (1950). 
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moved to the federal court.18 In the principal case he was already in the 
federal court, and properly so by terms of the statute.14 His only objection, 
then, should be that he was not able to exercise his privilege of having the 
case tried in the state court. To remedy this, Congress specifically provided 
that a later-joined defendant could ask for a remand of the case to the 
state court.15 Consistent with the intent of Congress, this procedure would 
give discretion to the district judge, who is most capable of protecting the 
private interests of all the parties as well as the public interest in the 
efficient administration of justice.16 
Nick E. Yocca, S.Ed. 
18 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1441(a): Shamrock Oil and Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 
(1941); Wright v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., (8th Cir. 1938) 98 F. (2d) 34. 
14 See notes 7 and 8 supra, and Gas Service Co. v. Hunt, (10th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 
417. 
15 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1448 provides, "This section shall not deprive any defendant 
upon whom process is served after removal of his right to move to remand the case." 
See Hutchins v. Priddy, r,v .D. Mo. 1952) 103 F. Supp. 601; Hunt v. Pearce, (8th Cir. 
1922) 284 F. 321; 2 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE, 3d ed., §3.134 (1951); LEwrs, 
REMOVAL OF CAUSES §290 (1923). 
16 For excellent comments on multiparty litigation in the federal courts, see 71 
HARv. L. R.Ev. 874 (1958); 58 CoL. L. R.Ev. 548 (1958). These do not, however, discuss the 
problems in the principal case. 
